INTRODUCTION
Recent corporate financial reporting scandals and evolving corporate governance requirements are increasing the expectation that boards of directors and senior executives effectively manage the risks facing their companies (Kleffner et. al., 2003; Walker et. al., 2003) . To meet these expectations, an increasing number of enterprises are embracing an enterprise-wide risk management approach, often referred to as enterprise risk management or "ERM."
ERM differs from traditional risk management, where organizations manage individual risks on an isolated basis and where risk interactions are not considered on an enterprise level (Aabo et. al., 2005) . Instead, ERM requires an enterprise-wide, top-down approach of managing risks holistically across the enterprise (Kleffner et. al., 2003) . In theory, ERM is designed to increase the board's and senior management's ability to oversee the portfolio of risks facing an enterprise to ensure that the entity's risk profile is within the stakeholders' risk tolerances (Beasley et. al., 2005) . The overall purpose of ERM is to protect and enhance stakeholder value (COSO, 2004) .
Many organizations appoint a senior executive, often referred to as the chief risk officer or "CRO," to oversee the enterprise's risk management process (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003) and the rate of those CRO appointments has increased through the 1990s, across a wide range of industries (Lam, 2001) . Because firms tend not to publicly announce the formation or existence of an ERM committee, prior research uses CRO announcements as a proxy for ERM implementation (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003) .
While there has been significant growth in the number of ERM programs, little empirical research has been conducted on the value of such programs (Tufano, 1996; Colquitt et al., 1999; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Beasley et. al., 2005) . In particular, there have been few challenges to the view that ERM provides a significant opportunity for competitive advantage (Stroh, 2005) and that ERM is designed to protect and enhance shareholder value (COSO, 2004) . However, modern portfolio theory suggests that an ERM approach to risk management could be value destroying, as shareholders, through portfolio diversification, can eliminate idiosyncratic risk in a virtually costlessly manner.
Consequently, under perfect capital market assumptions, any corporate expenditure on ERM results in a reduction in firm value and shareholder wealth. However, there are circumstances, driven by market imperfections and agency issues, under which risk management may be a positive net present value project (Stulz, 1996 (Stulz, , 2003 , and therefore the true effect of ERM on corporate value is uncertain.
This study provides empirical evidence on the value of corporate actions related to enterprise-wide risk management. Specifically, we examine the equity market responses to the firm's announcement of the appointment of a senior executive overseeing risk management for the enterprise. Our focus on hiring announcements of senior risk officers attempts to measure the valuation impact of the firm's enterprise or top-down approach to the risk management process.
Using a sample of 126 firms announcing the appointment of a senior executive overseeing the enterprise's risk management processes from 1992-2003, we find that the univariate average two-day market response is not significant, suggesting that a broad definitive statement about the benefit or cost of implementing ERM is not possible.
However, our multivariate analysis finds that there are significant relations between the magnitude of equity market returns and certain firm specific characteristics. For the non-financial firms in our sample, announcement period returns are positively associated with firm size, the volatility of prior periods' reported earnings, and the extent of intangible assets and negatively associated with slack and leverage. These associations are consistent with ERM adding value for firms in which agency costs or market imperfections are likely to amplify the portfolio of risks beyond stakeholder tolerances for risks. For financial firms, however, there is no statistical association for financial institutions, likely due to regulatory demands for ERM (Basel, 2003) . Our results suggest that the benefits of ERM are not consistent across firms, but are dependent on certain firm-specific characteristics.
This study contributes to the emerging stream of research related to enterprise risk management by providing empirical evidence about factors affecting shareholder reaction to announcements of CRO appointments. We demonstrate that the value of ERM may not be equal across enterprises, but that the value of ERM is dependent on specific firm characteristics that portfolio theory suggests are related to the need for risk management activities.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 provides background about the evolution of ERM and develops the hypotheses, section 3 describes the data and methodology, section 4 presents the results, and section 5 concludes.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Enterprise risk management (ERM) is rapidly emerging as the new paradigm for managing the complex portfolio of risks facing an enterprise (Tufano, 1996; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Beasley et. al. 2005; Slywotzky and Dzik, 2005) . Recent corporate financial reporting scandals and evolving corporate governance requirements are increasing expectations that boards of directors and senior executives are effectively managing risks (Kleffner et. al., 2003; Walker 2003) . For example, the New York Stock Exchange's final corporate governance rules now require audit committees to "discuss guidelines and policies to govern the process by which risk assessment and management is undertaken" (NYSE, 2004) . Section 409 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 requires public companies to disclose to the public "on a rapid and current basis such additional information concerning material changes in the financial condition or operations of the issuer, in plain English, which may include trend and qualitative information" (SOX, 2002) . In addition, emerging regulatory requirements for financial institutions are increasing management's responsibility for effective risk oversight by expanding analysis for credit and market risks to also include operational risks threatening financial institutions (Basel, 2003) . Rating agencies, such as Standard and Poors and Moody's, are also examining how managers are controlling and tracking the risks facing their enterprises (Samanta et al., 2005) .
One of the challenges associated with ERM implementation is determining the appropriate leadership structure to manage the identification, assessment, measurement, and response to all types of risks that arise across the enterprise. To respond to this challenge, many organizations are appointing a member of the senior executive team, often referred to as the chief risk officer or CRO, to oversee the enterprise's risk management process (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005) . There is a prevailing view that an ERM initiative cannot succeed, because of its scope and impact, without strong support in the organization at the senior management level with direct reporting to the chief executive officer or chief financial officer (Walker, et. al. 2002) . CROs often serve as the leader of the ERM program, providing direction and leadership about how the enterprise approaches risk management. Recent empirical research documents that the presence of a CRO is associated with a greater stage of ERM deployment within an enterprise, suggesting that the appointment of senior executive leadership affects the extent to which ERM is embraced within an enterprise (Beasley et. al., 2005) .
Some argue that the appointment of a chief risk officer is being used to signal both internally and externally that senior management and the board is serious about integrating all of its risk management activities under a more powerful senior-level executive (Lam, 2001) . Despite the growth in the appointment of senior risk executives, little is known about factors that affect an organization's decision to appoint a CRO or equivalent, and whether these appointments create value.
Evidence from previous research examining a small sample of firms (n = 26) appointing chief risk officers and a matched control sample finds that firms with greater financial leverage are more likely to appoint a CRO (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003) . This finding is argued to be consistent with the hypothesis that firms appoint CROs to reduce information asymmetry regarding the firm's current and expected risk profile, thus suggesting shareholders should value CRO appointments. This study extends the work of Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) by examining the equity market response to the firm's announcement of the hiring of a senior executive overseeing risk management. To our knowledge, previous research has not investigated explanations for the observed cross-sectional differences in the magnitude of the stock price response to the CRO hiring announcement. Because corporations disclose only minimal details of their risk management programs (Tufano, 1996) , our focus on hiring announcements of senior risk officers attempts to measure the valuation impact of the firm's signaling of an enterprise risk management process.
The basic premise that ERM is a value creating activity actually runs counter to basic modern portfolio theory. Portfolio theory shows that under certain assumptions, investors can fully diversify away all firm (or idiosyncratic) risk.
1 This can usually be achieved costlessly by randomly adding stocks to an investment portfolio. Because investors can diversify away firm-specific risk, they should not be compensated for bearing such risk (for example, risks associated with holding an undiversified portfolio). As a result, investors should not value costly attempts by firms to reduce firm-specific risk,
given an investor's costless ability to reduce idiosyncratic risk. Thus, under perfect capital market assumptions of modern portfolio theory, any expenditure on risk management would be value destroying and negatively perceived by investors.
While portfolio theory might suggest a lack of value associated with ERM implementation, markets do not always operate in the perfect manner presented by Markowitz. Stulz (1996 presents arguments under which risk management activities could be value increasing for shareholders when agency costs and market imperfections interfere with the operation of perfect capital markets. The motivation behind Stulz's work is to reconcile the apparent conflict between current wide-spread corporate embrace of risk management practices and modern portfolio theory.
Stulz (1996, 2003) argues that any potential value creation role for risk management is in the reduction or elimination of "costly lower-tail outcomes." Lower tail outcomes are those events in which a decline in earnings or a large loss would result in severe negative consequences for the firm. Thus, when a firm is faced with the likelihood of lower tail outcomes, engaging in risk management that reduces the likelihood of real costs associated with such outcomes could represent a positive net present value project.
Only firms facing an increased likelihood of these actual negative consequences associated with lower tail events will benefit from risk management, while other firms not facing such events will see no benefit at all (Stulz, 1996 (Stulz, , 2003 , and indeed could be destroying value by engaging in costly risk management.
Costs associated with lower tail events can be significant, calling for greater risk management activities as the likelihood of such occurrences increases. Events such as bankruptcy and financial distress involve direct cost outlays such as payments to lawyers and courts. These events involve indirect costs as well, such as an inability to pursue strategic projects, loss of customer confidence, and inability to realize the full value of intangible assets. Costs to shareholders can also include a decline in debt ratings and consequently higher borrowing costs. Additionally, managers and key employees of public firms may have an undiversifiable stake in the firm, and will bear a greater proportion of the cost of a lower tail event. Assuming an efficient labor market, employees will demand higher compensation for their risk bearing. Other stakeholders may be adversely affected by financial distress -for example, suppliers may be reluctant to enter into long term contracts with the firm if the potential for future payment is uncertain. As the likelihood of these occurrences increases, the potential benefit from enterprise risk management increases also.
Our study of equity market responses to announcements of appointments of CROs builds upon Stulz (1996 Stulz ( , 2003 to examine firm-specific variables that reflect the firm's likelihood of experiencing a lower-tailed event. These variables reflect firm-specific factors that finance theory suggests should explain the value effects of corporate risk management.
We assume that the hiring of a chief risk officer implies that the firm will expend some effort, and more importantly, corporate resources, on methods of reducing the likelihood of these lower-tailed events. As described more fully below, we focus on several factors that may impact earnings volatility by considering the extent of the firm's growth options, intangible assets, slack, earnings volatility, leverage, and firm size.
Growth Options. Firms with extensive growth options require consistent capital investment and may face greater asymmetric information regarding their future earnings (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984) . When in financial distress, growth options are likely to be undervalued and that distress may lead to underinvestment in profitable growth opportunities. When growth firms have limited access to financial markets, they may face higher costs in raising external capital, perhaps due to the asymmetric information surrounding these growth options, in a period of time when steadier streams of cash flows are desired (see Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993; Gay and Nam, 1998) . We hypothesize that the firms with greater growth options will have a positive abnormal return around hiring announcements of CROs.
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, the market reaction to firm announcements of appointments of CROs will be positively associated with the firm's growth options.
Intangible Assets. Firms that have more opaque assets, such as goodwill, are more likely to benefit from an ERM program because these assets are likely to be undervalued in times of financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985) . Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) , Geczy, Monton and Schrand (1995) and Dolde (1995) find that firms with high levels of research and development expense (often correlated with creation of intangible assets) are more likely to use derivatives to hedge risk. Conversely, Mian (1996) finds no relation between market-to-book (a common proxy for intangibles) and derivative use. We hypothesize that the firms with a large amount of intangible assets will have a positive abnormal return around hiring announcements of CROs:
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, the market reaction to firm announcements of appointments of CROs will be positively associated with the firm's amount of intangible assets.
Slack. Firms with greater slack, a common measure of liquidity, are less likely to benefit from a risk management program, as these firms can effectively insure themselves against lower tail outcomes with surplus cash. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) show that a firm's hedging activity can be value creating if it ensures that the firm has sufficient cash flow to invest in positive NPV projects. However, Tufano (1996) argues that cash flow hedging can create agency conflicts if managers are able to pursue projects without the discipline of external capital markets. In addition, less financial slack can increase the likelihood of financial distress for levered firms (Smith and Stulz, 1985) . We hypothesize that firms with greater financial slack will have a negative abnormal return around announcements of CRO appointments.
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, the market reaction to firm announcements of appointments of CROs will be negatively associated with the firm's financial slack.
Earnings Volatility. Firms with a history of greater earnings volatility are more likely to benefit from ERM, as these firms have greater likelihood of seeing a lower tail earnings outcome and of missing earnings forecasts. Additionally, the convexity of the tax code means that the tax rate on taxable income is usually higher than the tax rate applied to losses. Therefore a strategy of reducing earnings variability may reduce a company's overall tax burden and be wealth creating (Smith and Stulz, 1985) . We hypothesize that experiencing a high variance of earnings per share (EPS) will have a positive abnormal return around hiring announcements of CROs: 
DATA AND METHOD
Our study method examines the impact of firm-specific characteristics on the equity market response to announcements of appointments of CROs within the enterprise.
To obtain a sample of such appointments, we conduct a search of hiring announcements of From this list of 348 observations, we exclude 100 announcements made by private corporations, given the lack of observable financial and operational data needed to test our hypotheses. We exclude an additional 36 announcements made by foreign companies and 46 firms that did not have the required security market data necessary for our analysis.
Finally, 40 observations of public companies are dropped for not having the required financial statement data needed for analysis. The final sample includes 126 observations. and energy services (19.8%). These industries are often cited as being in the forefront of implementation of enterprise risk management (Beasley et. al., 2005) . This industry distribution is consistent with other survey data finding that highly regulated industries, such as financial services, have the best-developed basic processes for enterprise risk management, while manufacturing companies consistently lag more regulated industry sectors (PwC, 2004) .
[Insert Table 1 About Here] [Insert Table 2 About Here] Table 2 also contains information about the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the event period. We measure the announcement period as the day of the hiring announcement plus the following day. The announcement period return for the entire sample of announcements is -0.001 and is not statistically different from zero. The average CAR indicates that we cannot make a broad definitive statement about the benefit (or cost)
of implementing ERM, as on average, there is no value effect. For this reason our study focuses on the cross-sectional firm characteristics that we hypothesize may determine the value of effects of risk management.
We proxy for the hypotheses of interest using the following independent variables: Growth = the market value of the firm divided by its book value, with both variables measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement. Intangibles = book value of intangible assets divided by total assets measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement. Slack = the amount of cash as reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement divided by total assets measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement.
EPS Vol = standard deviation of the change in earnings per share over the eight quarters prior to the announcement. Leverage = total liabilities divided by market value of equity measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement. Size = the natural logarithm of the firm's market value of equity as measured at the end of the most recent fiscal quarter prior to the announcement.
Due to the large number of financial service firms in our sample we disaggregate our sample into financial service industry firms and non-financial service industry firms.
Descriptive information about these two sub-samples is reported in Table 3 . The sample of financial service firms is significantly larger in terms of assets and market value of equity and is not surprisingly more highly leveraged than the non-financial service firms. Finally, the financial service firms have, on average, reported fewer intangibles as a percentage of total assets and have less variable earnings per share than the sample of non-financial service firms.
[Insert Table 3 About Here] Leverage is consistent with debt frequently being secured against tangible assets. In general these correlations conform to our expectations.
[Insert Table 4 About Here]
To examine whether there are cross sectional differences in our hypothesized associations between firm-specific characteristics and the equity market reaction to announcements of appointments CROs, we use multivariate regression analysis.
Specifically, the general form of the model is the following (firm subscripts are omitted):
CAR(0,+1) = a 0 + a 1 Growth + a 2 Intangibles + a 3 Slack + a 4 EPS Vol + a 5 Leverage + a 6 Size + e
We expect to observe a positive association between the event period abnormal return and our proxies for growth opportunities, level of intangible ("opaque") assets, earnings volatility, leverage, and firm size. We expect to observe a negative association between the event period abnormal return and our proxy for firms' level of financial slack.
The next section presents the results of our multivariate regression analysis as defined by equation (1). and 5 are not supported by our full sample.
RESULTS
We do, however, find a positive association between the event period cumulative abnormal return and the firm's Size. This finding is consistent with our expectation as stated in Hypothesis 6 that larger firms are more likely to benefit from risk management activities than smaller firms.
As indicated by To examine whether the predicted associations described by our hypotheses are supported for firms in the financial services firms, we conducted our same multivariate regression analysis for the sub-set of firms (n = 49) that are in the financial services industry. We also conducted the same analysis for the remaining subset of firms not in the financial services industry (n = 77). The results of this analysis are reported separately in Table 6 .
17
[Insert Table 6 about here]
As shown in Table 6 , we find that of the six independent variables only the Slack variable is found to be significantly associated with the market reaction to announcements of appointments of senior executive officers overseeing risk management practices for the financial services firms in our sample, with the overall model not significant (F-Value of 0.89, p = 0.508). This result is consistent with the belief that regulatory pressures and requirements drive financial services institutions to embrace enterprise-wide risk management processes, not other firm-specific financial characteristics.
In contrast, the results shown in Table 6 for the sub-sample of firms in industries other than financial services indicate that, in the absence of similar regulatory expectations, several of the firm's financial characteristics may explain the firm's value enhancement due to ERM adoption. Our overall model is significant (p = 0.001), with an F-Value of 4.70 and R 2 of 0.226. For our non-financial firms (n = 77), we find that announcement period market returns are positively associated with the firm's extent of intangible assets, prior earnings volatility, and size, while negatively associated with the extent of slack and leverage. There is no statistical association between the announcement period returns and the firm's growth. While the results for intangibles, earnings volatility, size and slack are consistent with our expectations, the findings for leverage are opposite of our expectations.
One explanation for this result is that shareholders of highly leveraged firms may not want risk reduction as it reduces the value of the option written to them by debtholders. In this case, the option value outweighs the dead weight costs of bankruptcy that are increased with high leverage.
The results for our two sub-samples suggest that results for the full sample of announcement firms examined in Table 5 are driven mostly by the non-financial services firms, suggesting that key financial characteristics drive ERM related processes for firms outside financial services, while regulatory or other demands for risk management affect those processes in the financial services sector.
CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
This study provides initial empirical evidence about how the perceived value of enterprise risk management processes varies across companies. While ERM practices are being widely embraced within the corporate sector, not all organizations are embracing those practices and little academic research exists about the benefits and costs of ERM.
Overall, we find no aggregate significant market reaction to the hiring of CROs for neither the financial services nor non-financial services firms. This suggests that we cannot make any broad claims about ERM benefits or costs across a wide range of firms.
The absence of an overall average market reaction does not mean that the market is not reacting. In the cross section, we find that firms' shareholders respond largely in accordance with our expectations and value ERM where the program can enhance value by overcoming market distortions or agency costs. Specifically, we find that shareholders of large firms that have little financial slack value the embrace of ERM. Furthermore, shareholders of large non-financial firms, with volatile earnings, greater amounts of intangible assets and low leverage and low amounts of slack also react favorably to the use of ERM. These findings are consistent with the idea that a well implemented ERM program can create value when it restricts the likelihood of costly lower tail outcomes such as financial distress.
Despite providing some important academic insights about ERM, there are limitations to this existing study. First, while we are able to observe announcements of appointments of senior executives overseeing risk management practices, we are unable to observe the extent to which the related firms embrace an enterprise-wide approach to risk management. Further study of more specific announcements about ERM activities is warranted. Second, we are only able to measure short-term reactions to these announcements that extend across two days. We do not provide useful insights about the sustainability of ERM's value from a stockholder perspective. Third, we only measure equity market reactions to these hiring announcements. As a result, we do not provide any evidence of ERM's value to other stakeholders, such as creditors, employees, supplies, among others.
There is a tremendous need for further academic study about ERM practices. More insights are needed to better understand the decision made by some firms to embrace ERM as compared to the decision by others to not embrace ERM. Walker, P.L., (2003) . "ERM in practice," Internal Auditor, (August), 51-55. Where; Assets = the amount of total assets as reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement, in million of dollars. Liabilities = the amount of total liabilities as reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement, in million of dollars. MVE = the market value of equity at the end of the most recent fiscal quarter prior to the announcement, in million of dollars. Book Value = the book value of the firm at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement, in million of dollars. Sales = the amount of sales in the year prior to the announcement, in millions of dollars. CAR = the cumulative abnormal return for the event period, the announcement day plus the following day. Growth = the market value of the firm divided by its book value reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Intangibles = book value of intangible assets divided by total assets reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Slack = the amount of cash as reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement divided by total assets. EPSVol = the standard deviation of the change in earnings per share over the eight quarters prior to the announcement. Leverage = total liabilities divided by market value of equity reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Size = the natural logarithm of MVE at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. 12.529 Where; Assets = the amount of total assets as reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement, in million of dollars. Liabilities = the amount of total liabilities as reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement, in million of dollars. MVE = the market value of equity at the end of the most recent fiscal quarter prior to the announcement, in million of dollars. Book Value = the book value of the firm at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement, in million of dollars. Sales = the amount of sales in the year prior to the announcement, in millions of dollars. CAR = the cumulative abnormal return for the event period, the announcement day plus the following day. Growth = the market value of the firm divided by its book value reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Intangibles = book value of intangible assets divided by total assets reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Slack = the amount of cash as reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement divided by total assets. EPSVol = the standard deviation of the change in earnings per share over the eight quarters prior to the announcement. Leverage = total liabilities divided by market value of equity reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Size = the natural logarithm of MVE at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. between variables used in this study. Two-tailed probability values are in parentheses. The variables are defined as follows: CAR = the cumulative abnormal return for the event period, the announcement day plus the following day. Growth = the market value of the firm divided by its book value reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Intangibles = book value of intangible assets divided by total assets reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Slack = the amount of cash as reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement divided by total assets. EPSVol = the standard deviation of the change in earnings per share over the eight quarters prior to the announcement. Leverage = total liabilities divided by market value of equity reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Size = the natural logarithm of MVE at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. 0.0102 Where the dependent variable is CAR, the cumulative abnormal return for the event period, the announcement day plus the following day. Growth = the market value of the firm divided by its book value reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Intangibles = book value of intangible assets divided by total assets reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Slack = the amount of cash as reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement divided by total assets. EPSVol = the standard deviation of the change in earnings per share over the eight quarters prior to the announcement. Leverage = total liabilities divided by market value of equity reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Size = the natural logarithm of MVE at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. ***, **, *, indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is CAR, the cumulative abnormal return for the event period, the announcement day plus the following day. Growth = the market value of the firm divided by its book value reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Intangibles = book value of intangible assets divided by total assets reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Slack = the amount of cash as reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement divided by total assets. EPSVol = the standard deviation of the change in earnings per share over the eight quarters prior to the announcement. Leverage = total liabilities divided by market value of equity reported at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Size = the natural logarithm of MVE at the end of the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. ***, **, *, indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
